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\Equalizing Opportunity" is the policy objective underlying interest in generational
mobility. Absent any other objective, such a policy is counterfactually symmetric
in eect simultaneously increasing the upward mobility of those poorly endowed and
the downward mobility of those richly endowed. However, the inclusion of a pseudo
\Pareto-Utilitarian" policy imperative (That the inheriting generation should not be
made worse o in a rst order stochastic dominance sense) implies a \Qualied Equal
Opportunity" imperative yielding a \Conditional Mobility" policy more akin to com-
mon observation, since it is asymmetric in eect focusing on improving the mobility of
the poorly endowed without diminishing outcomes of the richly endowed. In terms of
generational regression models, such policies \convexify" the relationship and induce
a particular form of heteroskedastic error structure. In terms of Markov transition
matrices they generate structures quite dierent from those characterized by indepen-
dence. These two ideas are explored in the context of Gender Equity in educational
attainment in Canada for cohorts born between the 1920s and the 1970s, and the re-
sults are largely consistent with such a program with the exception of the very poorest
segment of society.
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1 Introduction
\The conception of social justice held by many, perhaps most, citizens of the
Western democracies is that of equality of opportunity. Exactly what that kind
of equality requires is a contested issue, but many would refer to the metaphor
of \leveling the playing eld", or setting the initial conditions in the competition
for social goods as to give all, regardless of their backgrounds an equal chance of
achievement. A central institution to implement that eld leveling is education,
meaning education that is either publicly nanced or made available to all at
aordable costs. " Roemer (2006)
With roots in recent egalitarian political philosophy1, the Equal Opportunity Imperative sees
dierential outcomes as ethically acceptable when they are the consequence of individual
choice and action but not ethically acceptable when they are the consequence of circum-
stances beyond the individual's control. To the extent that an individual's circumstances
have to do with their gender and the parents they were blessed with, equal opportunity
policies have to address the degree to which a child's status when adult is related to their
gender and the status of their parents at a similar stage in their life cycle. As Kanbur and
Stiglitz (1986) observed, in essence the issue is one of generational mobility and the manner
in which it engenders a dynastic aspect to poverty and wealth. The imperative has provoked
considerable empirical interest in the extent of generational mobility (or the degree to which
a child's parental circumstance conditions her outcomes), however evidence for complete
mobility (independence of outcome from circumstance) is at best mixed (see for example
Corak (2004) and references therein).
When Equal Opportunity is not the sole imperative there would probably be trade-os
or qualications for the policy maker to consider. Piketty (2000) noted as much in his inter-
pretation of the conservative   right wing view that, if generational mobility is low (because
of the high inheritability of ability) and the distortionary costs of welfare redistributions are
high, it is reasonable to argue that low mobility is acceptable2. Friedman (2005) argues the
other side of this coin in conjecturing (with a considerable amount of supporting evidence)
1See Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981a), Dworkin (1981b), and Dworkin (2000).
2Indeed the pursuit of an equal opportunity goal has not been unequivocal, Cavanagh (2002) expresses
some philosophical reservations, Jencks and Tach (2006) question whether an equal opportunity impera-
tive should require the elimination of \..all sources of economic resemblance between parents and children.
Specically ...(it)... does not require that society eliminate the eects of either inherited dierences in ability
or inherited values regarding the importance of economic success relative to other goals.". In a similar veinQuali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that economic growth has facilitated the equalizing of opportunities (amongst other improve-
ments in social justice) in eect allowing the poor to catch up without disadvantaging the
rich.
If other societal aspirations are at play in mediating the intergenerational mobility ob-
jective, then societies may be distinguished by the extent to which equal opportunity is the
only or primal policy goal. Here a distinction is made between societal ambitions for mobility
which are not conditioned on a child's socio-economic status and those which are. When so-
cietal mobility ambitions are free of concern for socio-economic status, it will pursue policies
which break both the good connects (productive parents producing productive children) and
the bad connects (unproductive parents producing unproductive children). The success or
failure of such policies is readily evaluated using statistical techniques which re
ect degrees
of dependence.
On the other hand, a conditional or qualied equal opportunity program could be charac-
terized as a policy of an armative action 
avour, focusing on breaking the \bad" connects
only. These policies incorporate normative objectives that weighs policies in the favour of
\poorly" endowed, and focuses on improving the life chances of the \inherited poor" rather
than diminishing the life chances of the \inherited rich"3. In focusing only on elevating
the prospects of the poorly endowed, the policy maker is in eect responding to a second
imperative, a sort of Pareto condition wherein the lot of the poorly endowed is improved
without diminishing the lot of the richly endowed. Indeed under such a Utilitarian mandate,
just breaking the \bad" connects elevates overall wellbeing. In essence increased mobility of
those poor in circumstance is revealed to have greater societal value than increased mobility
of those rich in circumstance (which in the face of constraints will almost by denition be in-
creased downward mobility which lowers aggregate material wellbeing under this mandate).
Here in terms of societal wellbeing, consuming resources in disinheriting the well endowed
(or destroying inherited human capital) and the concomitant distortionary wellbeing costs
is considered too high.
Dardanoni et al. (2006) question how demanding the pursuit of equal opportunity should be in terms of the
feasibility of such a pursuit.
3As a matter of casual empiricism, equal opportunity programs observed in \Liberal" societies do seem to
be of this 
avour. For example, when questioned on the widening gap between the rich and poor, the British
Prime Minister responded that \... the issue is not in fact whether the very richest person ends up being
richer. The issue is the poorest person is given the chance they don't otherwise have. The most important
thing is to level up, not level down." Interview with the Prime Minister on BBC News Newsnight on June
4, 2001. Transcript available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/newsnight/1372220.stmQualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 3
Should the policy maker follow the dual mandates of equal opportunity guided by a Util-
itarian imperative, a qualied equal opportunity program emerges with asymmetric mobility
aspirations for increasing the mobility of the poorly endowed and not increasing the mobility
of the well endowed when it involves a loss of their wellbeing. The extent to which these
objectives are fullled is bounded by the capacity in the system. Such policies can no longer
be characterized as unqualied moves towards the independence of outcomes and circum-
stances for all groups. They are rather equivocal moves, modifying the joint distribution
of outcomes and circumstances dierentially toward independence for the poor in circum-
stance and independence for the rich in circumstance only if their material wellbeing is not
diminished. Evaluating their success or failure requires rethinking the way current empirical
mobility measures (generational regression coecients and transition matrix structures) are
used and interpreted since generally they attach equal weight to both the poor and rich in
circumstance.
Implications of intergenerational mobility have been examined in van de Gaer, Schokkaert
and Martinez (2001) which demonstrates the axiomatic incompatibility of three possible mo-
tivations for examining intergenerational mobility: (1) mobility as movements of the con-
stituents of a society, (2) as an indicator of equal opportunity and (3) as an indicator of life
chances. Their aim was to develop a measure which could distinguish between these dis-
parate ambitions. They rst construed denition (1) as a preference for changes in economic
status across generations or movement (which they characterized by an empty diagonal in
the transition matrix). They dene (2) as the equalizing of opportunity of attaining a socio-
economic status by children across socio-economic groups (which is the context examined
in this paper). They argue that both these interpretations require contentious ordering of
variables (usually income in intergenerational studies) and propose (3) as a denition which
eliminates the need for such an ordering. This paper augments van de Gaer et al.'s (2001)
discussion by rst providing a simple model that illustrates the implications of mobility in
terms of unqualied or unconditional movements of the constituents of society, distinguishing
it from the distribution generated when mobility is qualied in nature. We then show that if
the researcher is concerned with qualied mobility, it has implications for the heteroskedas-
ticity of the error terms in the generational regression techniques commonly employed in
examining intergenerational mobility.
In Section 2 it is formally shown that when the policy maker faces the Pareto improvement
constraint of not making the children of specic socioeconomic groups materially worse o
under an equal opportunity policy, a Qualied Equal Opportunity Policy emerges. TheQualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 4
extent to which this can be achieved is limited by the degree of 
exibility in the system
(represented in the model presented by potential growth, much along the lines of Friedman
(2005)). Mobility improvements are qualied by their circumstance source in some sense and
implications for the way in which such mobility is measured are then developed. A means
of evaluating the success of mobility policies dierentially is developed in Section 3 where a
Qualied or Conditional Mobility measure is proposed which is simple to employ and permits
the identication and examination of group specic mobility changes in the sense that the
mobility of the \poor" or \rich" in circumstance can be addressed separately. Implications
for the way in which conventional measures of mobility are used and interpreted are also
examined.
To illustrate the concepts and their measurement, Statistics Canada's General Social
Survey Cycle 19 (2005) is used to examine the closing gender gap in educational attainment
that occurred in Canada4 (Blau et al. 2006) in section 4. One of the preoccupations of
Sen's considerable body of work on social justice is the achievement of gender justice (See
Nussbaum (2006), Sen (1990), Sen (1995) for example). This could have been achieved quite
swiftly by a transfer of resources from the investments in male human capital to investments
in female human capital. Had that been so, an improvement in the achievements of fe-
males accompanied by deterioration in the achievements of males would have been observed.
However it will be shown that, while male academic achievements did not deteriorate, the
narrowing gender gap is characterized by an increased generational mobility of women rela-
tive to men. Furthermore the source of this increased mobility was the daughters of parents
with lower educational attainments (which may be construed as a \good" since it implies
upward mobility) rather than the daughters of parents with high educational attainments
(which may be construed as a \bad" since it implies downward mobility and the attrition of
inherited wellbeing). Indeed it appears that the increased mobility of women has come about
as a consequence of a reduction in the dependence of their educational outcomes on those of
their mothers especially at the lower end of the maternal educational attainment spectrum.
However increasing immobility was observed in the lowest inheritance class. Finally, a brief
discussion of the results is provided in the section 5.
4This phenomena has also been observed in the United States see Buchmann and Diprete (2006), Dynarski
(2007), Goldin et al. (2006) and Jacob (2002).Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 5
2 The Constrained Equal Opportunity Imperative
2.1 Implications of Unqualied Intergenerational Mobility Policy
To illustrate matters assume that parent-child characteristics have 4 discrete realizations
(Though the model discussed can easily be generalized to any number of characteristic re-
alizations and the case when the number of realizations for both parent and child dier in
number. See Anderson and Leo (2008)). Consider a simple generational income class tran-
sition structure where the vector of parental incomes x = [1;2;3;4]0 transit to the vector of
child incomes y = [1;2;3;4]0, denoting each element as xi and yk, i;k 2 f1;2;3;4g, respec-
tively. That is xi and yk are realizations of random variables x (parental incomes) and y
(child incomes) respectively. Let the vector of probabilities for parents be p with elements pk
for the probability of a parent being in income class xk. Similarly, the vector of probabilities




























Let J be the matrix of joint probabilities, with element ji;k corresponding with the probability
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ji;k and ci =
4 P
k=1
ji;k, where i;k = f1;2;3;4g. Let P = dg(p), dg being the
diagonal operator, then the conventional transition matrix T can be written as T = JP 1
whose ith, kth element is Pr(y = yijx = xk) = ji;k=pk and yields the child's income class
vector c from the equation c = Tp (Noting that P 1p = 1, where 1 is vector of ones). Let
JI be the joint density matrix in a pure equal opportunity environment, where JI = cp0,
i.e. independence between parent-child outcomes which yields a transition matrix, TI with
common columns c re
ecting the fact that a child's life chances are the same for all parental
classes. Average parent and child incomes may be written as p0x and c0y respectively.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 6
On the other hand, when child outcomes are positively correlated with adult outcomes
the conditional distribution of the outcomes of children with low income parents will be
stochastically dominated by that of higher income parents so that, in its strongest form:
m P
i=1
(ji;l   ji;k)  0 for l < k; l, k, m = f1;:::;4g
A pure equal opportunity program is one which moves a joint density J towards JI. Note that
a move toward JI that preserves the children's socioeconomic status structure will necessarily
make the children of one parental income group worse o while making the children of
another better o. To see this, rst suppose the population's joint density matrix is such
that J 6= JI, in other words the population exhibits some dependence in mobility. Consider
the socioeconomic group denoted by the index x1 = 1. Let the nature of dependence be
such that j1;1 = maxfj1;1;j2;1;j3;1;j4;1g. Suppose the shift towards independence or mobility
shifts the attainment of children towards higher attainment. Then by denition of raising
mobility, it must necessarily be true that j1;1 > jI
1;1 = c1p1. Then for socioeconomic group


















where m 2 f1;2;3;4g, which means that a shift towards independence leads to a stochastic
dominant shift for socioeconomic group x1. However, since it is assumed that c remains
unchanged, this then implies that, j1;q < jI



















that is consequent to the shift towards independence without any qualifying conditions on
the policy, child outcomes of higher socioeconomic status families are necessarily made worse
o. Put another way, the children's outcome distribution in the status quo state, for higher
socioeconomic status families, rst order dominates that of the equal opportunity distribu-
tion.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 7
2.2 A Simple Model of the Qualied Mobility Problem Confronting
the Social Planner
The social planner's problem is modelled as one of minimizing the \distance" between the
















i;k is an element of the joint density matrix J the social planner is choosing, while
cI
ipk = jI
i;k is the joint density matrix under perfect independence. cI
i is an element of cI, the
desired marginal density vector of child income, determined by the social planner. Another
way to think about the choice of the social planner is that she is implicitly choosing the
level of funding or assistance towards diering socioeconomic groups to achieve the desired
parent-child joint density. It is clear that if there are no constraints, the optimal choice of
the social planner is to simply set J = JI, which is counter factual as noted above.
Consider augmenting the social planner's choice such that she faces two constraints.
Firstly, she wants to meet a growth rate constraint, g, which gives cI. Secondly, she wants
to promote equal opportunity but does not want the outcomes for children in any parental
income class to deteriorate. Note next that the existing parental income distribution, p, is
xed and immutable. With respect to the rst constraint, let J correspond to the existing
(i.e. pre-policy) transition matrix T which yields c with an average child outcome of c0y, and
suppose that J 6= cp0. Next let J correspond to the post policy transition matrix T which
yields an average child outcome of as much as c0y+g. In eect (Tp)
0 y = (J1)
0 y  c0y+g
is a constraint on the possible choices of J since, as demonstrated above, when g is 0 no
move of the elements of J toward an equal opportunity structure is possible without making
the children of at least one parental income group worse o. Noting again that pure equal
















where c is the corresponding vector of marginals from the constrained mobility policy chosen
by the social planner.
The second utilitarian constraint constrains the rows of J to rst order stochastically
dominate the corresponding rows of J following the notion that the young generation shouldQualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 8
not be made worse o by the equal opportunity policy. Put another way, the new conditional
density (conditional on the child's socioeconomic status) must rst order stochastically dom-
inate the status quo conditional density. In this simple stylized model, the social planner's






q = f1;2;3g, and that
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i=1 c




















































i;k 2 [0;1] 8i and k. That is she wants to ensure
that in choosing the matrix of joint densities, children of each socioeconomic group do not
suer a fall in welfare, and that growth in child outcomes is met at the same time. The
question of equal opportunity phrased in this form highlights the competing considerations.





















































  g  0 
  0 (6)
where r = f1;2;3g, l = f1;2;3;4g. When the constraints do not bind (r;l = 0 for r =
f1;2;3g, l = f1;2;3;4g and 
 = 0) the solution to (4) is the equal opportunity solution
j
r;l = cI
rpl, 8r;l. As the constraints successively bind the equal opportunity outcome is
successively compromised with the solution being a combination of the initial and equal
opportunity outcomes.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 9
First note that the solution for the richest parental group (l = 4 in equation (4)) contains
a compounding of the stochastic dominance shadow prices of each socioeconomic group. This
implies that not meeting the stochastic dominance constraint at the lowest socioeconomic
level implies costs at all socioeconomic levels. Thus suppose the initial state is one of
complete immobility and g > 05, the social planner would reallocate the j1;l's to the extent
that (6) does not bind and (5) does not bind for l = 1, thereby improving the mobility
of the poorest children (note that increased mobility for the richest children would involve
increased downward mobility making them worse o and con
icting with the dominance
condition (5). Should there still be capacity for change, the j2;l's would next be reallocated
and so on until the growth constraint is exhausted or complete equality of opportunity is
achieved. Insofar as a move towards independence for children of higher socioeconomic
status families implies a welfare reduction for them, a social planner abiding by the above
program will not implement it. On the other hand, children of lower socioeconomic status
families will see a shift towards independence, such that the post policy conditional density
for them will rst order stochastically dominate their pre-policy joint density. Finally, note
that an implicit assumption in this model is that the cost of shifting children at various
socioeconomic groups are constant, and the \distance" of the characteristic realization (in
this case here income groups) are equidistant apart. Although relaxing the latter has no
implication for this illustrative model, the former is substantial. If the costs of improving
the stead of the children dier across socioeconomic groups, then improving the lot of those
\high cost" children may impede the attainment of the desired level of growth in average
income.
Now consider how this program aects within group variance, and its relative change
vis- a-vis other socioeconomic groups. Let l < q be two socioeconomic groups where l is
aected by the social planner's policy towards qualied mobility, while q remains at the
status quo, that is j
i;q = ji;q, 8q 6= l. Without lost of generality, let the only socioeconomic











pl yi. Next let r;l = j
r;l   jr;l and let r be the realization at or below which
the density falls or remains the unchanged. After some manipulation (See appendix A.2) it
5Recall that if g were 0 no move toward an equal opportunity policy could be made without making some
of the children in at least one of the income classes worse o.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 10
may be shown that the variance falls if and only if,
8
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Note that the sign of the variance in child realizations is dependent on the degree of stochastic
dominance shift (which in turn is dependent on the targeted distribution of child realizations,
cI), the initial distribution, and the relative dierence between the realizations of the outcome
realizations. Intuitively, from a high level of dependence or immobility, a shift towards
independence should yield an increase in variance.
To see the implications of the above discussion, consider the following example; suppose
the pre and post qualied equal opportunity policy child-adult joint densities are J0 and J1
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Pre-policy child outcomes are one to one with their parents, while post-policy there has
been a \convexication" of this relationship with the children of the poorest parents now
receiving an average outcome of 1.5 rather than a 1. Note that the conditional variance of
low categories child outcomes will be greater than the pre-policy outcome (0.25 as opposed
to 0) as well as the variance of the other socioeconomic groups. However, if J1 were the
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Here child outcomes have been further \convexied" and the lowest child outcome has been
completely eliminated, noting the fall in variance across time, while variances across all
socioeconomic groups remain the same.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 11
To restate the key insights from this simple model; Firstly, mobility for the children
of a particular socioeconomic group is achieved if and only if there is a possibility for a
stochastic dominant shift. Secondly, under a qualied mobility policy the parent-child out-
come relationship is \convexied". Thirdly, there would be an asymmetric change in the
variance by socioeconomic group, so that empirical examination of mobility has to account
for heteroskedasticity. For instance based on the previous example, beginning from a high
level of immobility or dependence in the parent-child income relationship, we would expect
variance to be falling by socioeconomic status, since the higher socioeconomic groups would
not be aected by the qualied mobility program and experience no change in variance,
while families in the lower socioeconomic groups would see an increase in variance. Finally,
the change in variance among socioeconomic groups across time is dependent on the degree
of pre-policy immobility6.
3 Measuring Conditional or Qualied Mobility
3.1 Induced Hypotheses
Intergenerational mobility has often been examined via the regression coecient () of a
child's characteristic when adult (y) on the corresponding parental characteristic (x) (Solon
1992).
y =  + x + 
x
2 + 
where  is the population error term (and 
 = 0 for now). In eect that literature interpreted
 as a mobility index, building upon Becker and Tomes (1979) to create a rich class of models
highlighting the forces that determined the value of , where it inferred mobility (equal
opportunity) as  ! 0 and immobility (unequal opportunity) as  ! 1. Since Atkinson
(1983) there has been interest in the nonlinearity of generational income elasticity (
 < 0)
or asymmetry of mobility7, largely stimulated by Becker and Tomes's (1986) conjecture that
parent-child outcome relationships are concave due to asymmetries in borrowing constraints.
Presumably theories of diminishing returns to human capital transfer and regression to the
6In the case of continuous variates, the problem of induced heteroskedasticity may be addressed by quantile
regressions (See Grawe (2004a), Grawe (2004b)) without directly modelling heteroskedasticity, however in
the case where the outcome variable is broadly categorized into socioeconomic groups the problem is likely
to still exist.
7Behrman and Taubman (1990), Solon (1992), Mulligan (1999), Corak and Heisz (1999), Couch and
Lillard (2004), Grawe (2004c) and Bratsberg et al. (2007) all being examples.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 12
mean would also produce a similar conjecture. However here it is suggested that, whatever
the initial generational regression relationship, a qualied equal opportunity program would
reduce concavity and increase the extent to which conditional error heteroskedasticity of the
child outcome is negatively related to adult income. It should be noted that an unqualied
equal opportunity program in our model suggests that the stochastic errors associated with
child outcomes would be homoskedastic with respect to socioeconomic status or parental
outcome.
Thus the notion of a Qualied Equal Opportunity program induces several testable hy-
potheses. Firstly, it induces a positive dependence of the child characteristic on the parental
characteristic since a qualied mobility policy would leave children of higher socioeconomic
status families at the status quo (immobility) while improving the mobility for children of
lower socioeconomic status families (mobility). Secondly, as a result of the qualied mobility
policy, the eect of income/socioeconomic status would become less concave, implying a fall
in j
j. Finally, as noted in the previous section, depending on the initial conditional variance
of child outcomes with respect to adult, there would be a change in conditional variance
across socioeconomic groups and time, generally towards increased negative dependence.
These hypothesized changes maybe illustrated by considering the same example as in
the previous section with J and J as the pre- and post-policy dependence structure respec-
tively. In the pre-policy state, the generational regression has a coecient of one (complete
immobility) and a conditional variance of 0. The move toward independence between parent
and child outcomes among low socioeconomic status families induces a reduction in con-
cavity in the generational regression, 
attening out the regression line (as observed in the
results in Bratsberg et al. (2007)). In addition, for the low socioeconomic status group, the
conditional variance of child outcomes will be greater than the pre-policy outcome (0.25 as
opposed to 0) and greater than at higher socioeconomic groups where greater dependence
between parent-child outcomes will be exhibited. This suggests that, in addition to a falling
, the residuals in a generational mobility regression may exhibit increased negative depen-
dence on the parental status variable, if initial dependence is high, as a consequence of a
qualied mobility policy.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 13
3.2 Alternative Approach to Examining Intergenerational Mobil-
ity
Mobility interpretations of  are to some extent limited by its connection to the linear corre-
lation coecient yx ( = yx(
y
x)), and that statistic's ability to re
ect general dependency.
They are further circumscribed by the degree to which the parent-child outcome relation-
ship is homogeneously linear across all strata of the outcome in question. Alternatively the
transition matrix, T, between the common quantiles of the marginal density vectors p and c
can be more informative as to the nature of the dependence when it is non-linear. This has
given rise to the application of techniques derived from Markov Chain processes and the de-
velopment of mobility indices, some based upon the nature of the transition matrix directly,
some based upon other concepts8, but all of them re
ecting to varying degrees the extent
to which the underlying variables, x and y, are independent. With complete mobility the
columns of the transition matrix would be identical (corresponding to independence between
parent and child outcomes) while with complete immobility the leading diagonal would have
as its elements 1.
For the present discussion, assume that the realizations are continuous and let x 2 X =
[x;x]  f0g+R+ and y 2 Y = [y;y]  f0g+R+. Let j(x;y) be the joint density function of
the parent-child realization, and let p(x) and c(y) be the marginal density functions of the
realizations for parent and child respectively. Following Anderson, Ge and Leo (2009), the
degree of mobility is assessed via the joint distribution of x and y (namely j(x;y)) since such
an approach is amenable to evaluating mobility conditional on particular ranges of parental
outcome x (in other words socioeconomic group(s) of interest). The approach is based on
the notion that if x and y are independent for a particular range of x and y, say ax < x < bx











c(y)dy = 0 (7)
This relation provides the basis of the contingency table test which examines whether or not
Pr(ax < x < bx;ay < y < by) = Pr(ax < x < bx)Pr(ay < y < by) for the set of intervals
f(ax;bx) 2 Xg and f(ay;by) 2 Y g, where ax and ay are vectors of lower integral limits, and
8Bartholemew (1982), Blanden et al. (2004), Chakravarty (1995), Dearden et al. (1997), Hart (1983),
Maasoumi (1986), Maasoumi (1986), Prais (1955), Shorrocks (1978), have all produced mobility indices
many of which are discussed in Maasoumi (1996).Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 14
bx and by are vectors of upper integral limits for x and y respectively, and they delineate
mutually exclusive and exhaustive intervals in X and Y respectively.





















over the collections of intervals. This index is a measure of the extent to which the empirical
joint density and the joint density implied by independence, overlap or coincide. The index
has a support of [0;1], where 1 indicates complete independence (mobility), with lower
values indicating relative dependence (immobility). Further, the value of the statistic is
asymptotically normally distributed (Anderson et al. 2009), consequently permitting simple
statistical comparison of mobility states.












c(y)dy = 0 (9)
This relation asks if the conditional probability of a child's outcome given its parent's out-
come is equal to the marginal probability of the child's outcome. Conditional or qualied
mobility may be examined by considering the sum of terms of the form:
min
8
> > > > <














> > > > =
> > > > ;
(10)
In this case the sum is taken over (ay;by) that exhaust the range of y. Such a statistic mea-
sures the proximity of the conditional distribution to its corresponding marginal distribution
where the conditioning region is the range of the parental characteristic of interest. It has
the same numeric and statistical properties as the overall mobility statistic outlined above
and is more informative in the sense that mobility conditional upon a particular inherited
circumstance can be examined.
Finally, note that these techniques can be easily generalized to examine questions in-
volving more than 2 variables. For example, suppose the researcher wishes to examineQualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 15
how parental education (w) and income (x) is transmitted to their child's education(z) and
income(y). Let (ai;bi) where i 2 fw;x;y;zg, be the interval under consideration, then a




















(see Anderson et al. (2009)).
4 An Example: Narrowing the Educational Gender
Gap in Canada
One profound change in the latter part of the 20th century was the emancipation of women
and the declining signicance of gender in labour and consequently educational outcome
(Blau et al. 2006). The introduction of the pill, abortion rights and legislation against
gender discrimination in the workplace improved the wellbeing and status of women in
those years (Pezzini 2002, Goldin and Katz 2002, Siow 2002). One dimension in which
this found expression is in the narrowing gap in academic achievement of men and women
(Dynarski 2007). To study this phenomenon in light of the hypothesized qualied mobility
mandate, the educational achievements of successive cohorts of Canadian individuals and
their parents are compared. Relating to our previous discussion, the educational outcome
of children here is the variable y, while that of the parent's is x. A priori under a qualied
mobility policy, we should see an improvement in mobility of children of lower socioeconomic
status families regardless of gender. Further, the circumstances favouring women implies that
the gains to them over the years should also be greater than it was for men.
4.1 Summary of Data
The data on academic achievements of children and their parents in Canada are drawn from
Statistics Canada's General Social Survey Cycle 19 (2005). Table 1 outlines the attain-
ment index which associates integers 1 through 5 with the highest academic achievements
of individuals aged 25 and above and their parents in 2005.
Table 2 summarizes the proportion of individuals in each educational attainment category
and the corresponding proportion of observations with their parents in those categories by theQualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 16
Table 1: Attainment Denition
Index/Year 2005
1 Some Secondary or Elementary or No Education
2 High School Diploma
3 Some University
4 Trade or Technical Diploma or Certicate
5 Bachelors or Masters or Doctorate Degree
individual's gender and cohort (decade in which they were born). Note that for individuals
born in the 1940s and earlier, the upper attainment levels are dominated by males, but this
changes in favour of females in later cohorts, corresponding with the increased female labour
force participation in the post World War II decades.
Table 3 presents a comparison of male and female academic attainment distributions
across the cohorts, highlighting the turnaround in the academic achievements of males and
females over time. Interpreting the continuous child outcome y from our previous discussion
as education attainment, we can then denote A(y) as the monotonically increasing edu-
cational attainment index function. Let the distribution function of attainment for males
and females be Cm(y) and Cf(y) respectively. Then a necessary and sucient condition
for E[A(y)] to be greater for males than females is Cm(y)  Cf(y) for all y, the rst order
dominance criterion. For the cohorts born before 1940, we see three signicantly negative
dierences at 5% level of signicance and no signicantly positive dierences revealing that
male attainment outcomes rst order stochastically dominate that of their female counter-
parts. However tracking upwards in table 3, it is clear that the attainment gap narrowed
across the cohorts, since the dierence between male and female distributions disappeared
by the 1950s, and in fact the trend of the pre-1940 years were completely reversed by the
1970s (Noting that there were three signicant positive dierences for the 1970s cohort).
4.2 The Generational Regression Approach
In analyzing educational mobility in the context of generational regressions, the model con-
sidered is of the form:
yi;k = k + 1;kxi;k + 2;kx
2
i;k + i;k (11)Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 17
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Gender and Cohort









Own 0.060335 0.15531 0.16425 0.31173 0.30838
Male 895 Father's 0.28492 0.3095 0.059218 0.1162 0.23017
70s Mother's 0.20447 0.40894 0.056983 0.13184 0.19777
Own 0.04802 0.11542 0.14575 0.32266 0.36816
Female 1187 Father's 0.32098 0.27548 0.068239 0.14827 0.18703
Mother's 0.27885 0.34709 0.073294 0.16428 0.13648
Own 0.081809 0.14918 0.12801 0.35226 0.28874
Male 1039 Father's 0.43503 0.30318 0.032724 0.07026 0.15881
60s Mother's 0.38499 0.36959 0.029836 0.087584 0.12801
Own 0.052985 0.14179 0.15149 0.34104 0.31269
Female 1340 Father's 0.4791 0.24776 0.050746 0.08209 0.1403
Mother's 0.43358 0.30522 0.049254 0.10672 0.10522
Own 0.1206 0.17286 0.15075 0.26533 0.29045
Male 995 Father's 0.60905 0.19397 0.036181 0.044221 0.11658
50s Mother's 0.50151 0.33166 0.030151 0.056281 0.080402
Own 0.076603 0.18068 0.14488 0.32889 0.26894
Female 1201 Father's 0.58701 0.22315 0.037469 0.045795 0.10658
Mother's 0.54621 0.26978 0.036636 0.079933 0.067444
Own 0.13505 0.1563 0.13809 0.23672 0.33384
Male 659 Father's 0.6434 0.22003 0.028832 0.028832 0.078907
40s Mother's 0.58574 0.26859 0.021244 0.054628 0.069803
Own 0.15271 0.18439 0.1267 0.28959 0.24661
Female 884 Father's 0.67647 0.17308 0.030543 0.041855 0.078054
Mother's 0.65271 0.20023 0.024887 0.062217 0.059955
Own 0.32689 0.15641 0.11775 0.14587 0.25308
Male 569 Father's 0.73111 0.15114 0.040422 0.02109 0.056239
 30s Mother's 0.68366 0.19156 0.031634 0.045694 0.047452
Own 0.34724 0.18602 0.1195 0.20068 0.14656
Female 887 Father's 0.7283 0.14431 0.027057 0.036077 0.064262
Mother's 0.71477 0.16234 0.020293 0.049605 0.052988Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 18
Table 3: Males vs. Females Cumulative Densities and First Order Dominance Results







Male CDF 0.08452 0.24911 0.41637 0.74110 1.00000
Female CDF 0.07226 0.20109 0.34833 0.67962 1.00000
70s Dierence 0.01226 0.04802 0.06804 0.06148
 0.01070 0.01661 0.019260 0.01786
P(Zz) 0.87409 0.99808 0.99979 0.99971
Male CDF 0.12700 0.29028 0.42598 0.75980 1.00000
Female CDF 0.07988 0.24310 0.39942 0.73793 1.00000
60s Dierence 0.04711 0.04717 0.02655 0.02186
 0.01108 0.01598 0.01776 0.01561
P(Zz) 0.99999 0.99843 0.93260 0.91939
Male CDF 0.15589 0.35201 0.50144 0.76940 1.00000
Female CDF 0.13067 0.33454 0.46521 0.78523 1.00000
50s Dierence 0.02522 0.01747 0.03623 -0.01583
 0.01278 0.01728 0.01817 0.01515
P(Zz) 0.97580 0.84401 0.97693 0.14802
Male CDF 0.25280 0.41698 0.53265 0.76772 1.00000
Female CDF 0.22996 0.42621 0.54231 0.82171 1.00000
40s Dierence 0.02284 -0.00923 -0.00966 -0.05399
 0.01757 0.02025 0.02045 0.01662
P(Zz) 0.90314 0.32425 0.31832 0.00058
Male CDF 0.44424 0.58003 0.68525 0.83723 1.00000
Female CDF 0.44261 0.61818 0.72443 0.90454 1.00000
 30s Dierence 0.00163 -0.03815 -0.03918 -0.06731
 0.01903 0.01879 0.01753 0.01310
P(Zz) 0.53413 0.02118 0.01272 0.00000Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 19
where E(i;k) = 0 and E(ln2
i;k) = 
 + xi;k where i = f1;2;:::;nkg, k = fmale;femaleg.
As before y corresponds to the child and x the parent's outcome (in terms of educational
attainment) and heteroskedasticity is modeled in terms of the log squared error being a linear
function of parental attainment. The results are reported in tables 4 and 5. At the outset
it should be noted that the generational transfer technology appears to be concave i.e. it
appears to exhibit diminishing returns to parental ability.
Examining the coecients of the regression for all the female cohorts from table 4, note
rst that for females both maternal and paternal eects are highest for cohorts born in
the 1940s, but gradually declining with each cohort. Table 5 reports the same results for
males and exhibits a similar pattern of falling eect due to parental educational attainment,
all of which are evidence of increased educational mobility within both genders. Further,
examining the coecient for heteroskedasticity for each gender in turn, note that all the
coecients are all negative and statistically signicant, arming the prediction of the model
that variances should be decreasing across socioeconomic groups (in terms of parental educa-
tion attainment). In addition, for both child genders, the maternal eect was stronger, and
heteroskedasticity seem to be greatest among the 1950s, post World War II cohorts, re
ecting






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Quali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Table 6: Standard Normal Tests for Concavity Changes Across Cohort
Male Female
Father Mother Father Mother
70s-60s -1.7596 -1.7690 0.8019 -0.4194
(0.0392) (0.0384) (0.7887) (0.3375)
70s-50s -2.0526 -2.3302 -0.0629 -2.6567
(0.0201) (0.0099) (0.4749) (0.0039)
70s-40s -5.277 -3.6077 -2.2034 -2.7229
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0138) (0.0032)
70s-30s -1.6470 -2.2113 0.0533 -0.1705
(0.0498) (0.0135) (0.5213) (0.4323)
60s-50s -0.4150 -0.6674 -0.8194 -2.303
(0.3391) (0.2523) (0.2063) (0.0107)
60s-40s -3.8384 -2.1906 -2.8805 -2.4070
(0.0000) (0.0142) (0.0020) (0.0080)
60s-30s -0.2893 -0.8844 -0.6475 0.2015
(0.3862) (0.1883) (0.2586) (0.5796)
50s-40s -3.3039 -1.5570 -2.0624 -0.3601
(0.0005) (0.0597) (0.0196) (0.3593)
50s-30s 0.0520 -0.3413 0.1068 2.2389
(0.5207) (0.3664) (0.5425) (0.9874)
40s-30s 2.9179 1.0106 2.0498 2.3649
(0.9982) (0.8439) (0.9798) (0.9910)
p-values in parenthesis.
Tables 6 and 7 tests the \convexication" and heteroskedasticity comparisons across the
ve cohorts respectively. Through the ve cohorts, there seem to have been a signicant
decline in concavity of the \production function", somewhat more pronounced for males
than females. For males born in the 1970s, the quadratic term was in fact not signicant
in terms of transmission from both fathers and mothers. Concerning the heteroskedasticity
parameter, it appears to have become substantially more negative when the comparison is
made between the female cohort born in the 1950s against earlier cohorts. The patterns
of declining heteroskedasticity is likewise noted for males throughout the cohorts from the
earliest year to the cohort born in the 1960s. Taken together, the above ndings highlight
the increase in mobility across the decades for both genders, emphasizing the primary point
made by the qualied mobility program hypothesis that it will not impinge on the progress
or lack of mobility for the well endowed (here the well endowed being male children).Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 23
Table 7: Standard Normal Tests for Heteroskedasticity Changes Aross Cohort
Male Female
Father Mother Father Mother
60s-70s -1.9192 -1.3191 -0.6309 -2.4152
(0.0275) (0.0936) (0.2641) (0.0079)
50s-70s -0.4737 -0.2638 -2.3998 -4.5190
(0.3179) (0.3960) (0.0082) (0.0000)
50s-60s 1.3441 1.1094 -1.7440 -1.9779
(0.9105) (0.8664) (0.0406) (0.0240)
40s-70s 1.8913 1.5123 -0.5892 -1.0226
(0.9707) (0.9348) (0.2778) (0.1532)
40s-60s 3.7831 2.9635 -0.0713 1.1380
(0.9999) (0.9985) (0.4716) (0.8724)
40s-50s 2.2967 1.8487 1.3398 2.9467
(0.9892) (0.9677) (0.9099) (0.9984)
30s-70s 4.0688 5.9538 5.7493 5.7732
(1.000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000)
30s-60s 6.1310 7.6332 6.3443 8.0706
(1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000)
30s-50s 4.4406 6.4447 8.2027 10.3603
(1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000)
30s-40s 2.0448 4.5098 5.3745 6.1401
(0.9796) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000)
p-values are in parenthesis
4.3 The Overlap Measure
The \Qualied Equal Opportunity" hypothesis suggests that the conditional density of child
attainment for lower socioeconomic groups should be a closer match to the marginal density
of child attainment relative to the children from higher socioeconomic status groups since
a qualied mobility policy would leave the latter group largely untouched. Section 3.2
provides a test that could easily be performed, which intuitively measures the degree of








(12)Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 24
The Overlap measure between the conditional density and the marginal density for each










for each k 2 f1;2;:::;ng. If child outcomes and parental circumstances are independent, the
Overlap measure will record values close to 1. To the extent that they are not independent
the statistic will record a value less than 1. The results of this measure for each parental
attainment outcome by gender of the children are reported in table 8. Since the measure
is asymptotically normal (Anderson et al. 2009), we can examine how the measure diers
across each cohort (reported in table 9), parental attainment groups which we use as a proxy
for socioeconomic group status (reported in table 10), and across gender of the children
(reported in table 11). Tables 9 to 11 then essentially detail the direction and evolution, and
the statistical signicance of the changes.
From table 8, according with expectations, note the strong tendency of the Overlap mea-
sure to move towards 1 among children of parents with High School education to Technical
training for both genders. This pattern is strongest when comparisons are made between the
cohorts born in the 1960s and 1970s against the earlier cohorts and it is stronger (in terms of
the change in the Overlap measure) among females. This pattern is not mimicked by children
with parents with University education and particularly parents who did not complete their
education. The former accords with our Qualied Mobility Policy conjecture, since a high
dependence between parent-child outcomes in the status quo would render these children
outside the sphere of in
uence of this policy. All measures are signicantly dierent from
1 suggesting that a pure equal opportunity imperative has not been pursued or achieved.
Finally, note that maternal eects were greater than paternal for both genders.
The drive toward higher mobility can be examined by comparing cohorts within a par-
ticular parental attainment class, with successful policies rendering statistically signicantly
higher mobility measures with successively younger cohorts. However, from the perspective
of the qualied equal opportunity program, the comparison should be between particular
parental attainment groups within a particular cohort where such programs would result in
statistically signicantly lower mobility coecients in higher attainment groups. These com-
parisons are reported in Tables 9 and 10 respectively, which look specically at daughters of
mothers and sons of fathers comparisons9.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 27
From Table 9, observe that excepting \Drop Out" parents, all of the signicant changes
across cohorts are increasing mobility changes, predominantly among children with \High
School" parents (and then more so with females than males as adjudged from table 10). There
are a few signicant increases among the daughters of \Technical Education" parents but
no signicant mobility changes across cohorts in the children (of either gender) of University
Graduates, all of which is consistent with a Qualied Mobility program. What is at odds
with the Qualied Mobility scenario is the signicant reductions in mobility experienced by
the younger cohorts in the \Drop Out" parent category. This suggests a forgotten segment
of the populace that public policy has neglected. In the stylized model, it has implicitly been
assumed that the cost of advancing children across the distribution is the same but in all
probability this is not the case. A more appropriate model would explicitly include the cost
to the social planner of aecting the dierent cells of the density vector. Intuitively, if the cost
of improving the mobility of the lowest socioeconomic group is relatively the highest, then
it is those children that might be left behind. The results of Table 10, reporting the within
cohort across parental attainment category comparisons, are equally supportive of a Qualied
Mobility paradigm. Again excluding the \Drop Out" category, mobility is signicantly higher
in the lower attainment categories and is more so in the recent as compared to the older
cohorts.
Finally a comparison of the qualied mobility of daughters of mothers with that of sons
of fathers reported in Table 11 reveals that with one exception (among children in the 1950s
cohort, with parents with some college education), all of the signicant dierences relate to
higher mobility of daughters in more recent cohorts. Furthermore the advances have taken
place among children of parents with high school education. No signicant dierences were
identied in the  1930s cohort and only one signicant dierence was observed in the 1940s
cohort at 10% level of signicance. This signals the advances that females have made over
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0.0051 3.2198 -0.9266 1.0055 0.1001
(0.5021) (0.9994) (0.1771) (0.8427) (0.5399)
1960s Cohort
2.3160 3.0624 -0.3185 1.5373 0.9775
(0.9897) (0.9989) (0.3750) (0.9379) (0.8359)
1950s Cohort
0.2246 -0.5940 -2.4426 -0.8129 1.9354
(0.5889) (0.2763) (0.0073) (0.2081) (0.9735)
1940s Cohort
0.5035 1.3646 0.3290 -1.1952 0.3198
(0.6927) (0.9138) (0.6289) (0.1160) (0.6254)
 1930s
Cohort
0.6883 -0.3558 -0.0099 0.7458 0.6651
(0.7544) (0.3610) (0.4960) (0.7721) (0.7470)
Note: Pr(Z  z) are in parenthesis
5 Conclusions
It has been demonstrated that in the absence of sucient 
exibility or capacity in a soci-
ety, the unqualied pursuit of an equal opportunity goal results in some people being made
worse o while others are made better o. If some sort of Pareto-Utilitarian goal is also an
objective of the policy maker (in eect a maintenance of the status of the well endowed) in a
constant cost world, a qualied equal opportunity outcome emerges in which the most disad-
vantaged are addressed rst. With such a program, complete independence of outcome from
circumstance will not be observed across all socioeconomic groups and conventional mea-
sures of mobility will not record complete mobility. However such policies have predictable
consequences for generational regressions and suggest ways that mobility measures could
be re-interpreted. Qualied equal opportunity policies will induce a reduction in concavity
in the prevailing generational regression relationship as well as inducing heteroskedasticity
in the corresponding error process which is negatively related to the conditioning variable.
Alternatively evaluating conditional mobility policies via the transition matrix or joint dis-
tribution of outcomes and circumstance requires indices which identify changes in mobility
by subgroup or conditional mobility measurement.
To illustrate the concept and the associated indices, the success of various equal oppor-
tunity policies pursued either implicitly or explicitly in the emancipation of women was eval-
uated in terms of how they narrowed the gender gap in educational attainment in Canada.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 30
Hypotheses relating to generational regressions that are consistent with a qualied equal
opportunity program are not rejected for daughters whereas they are for sons. From the
conditional mobility indices comparisons, the gender gap appears to have been narrowed by
an increase in the mobility of the daughters of parents of lower educational status, with-
out any change in the mobility of daughters or sons in the highest parental educational
attainment category. All of which is what would have been expected from a Qualied Equal
Opportunity or Conditional Mobility Policies.
It also appears that there is a segment of children, both males and females, of dropout
parents whom society has neglected in that their mobility has diminished. It is conjectured
that, contrary to what is implicitly assumed in the model here presented, the cost of improv-
ing the stead of the deprived are not the same as those associated with other better endowed
segments of the populace. If those cost are signicantly higher, the social planner may be
less inclined to improve their mobility in the rst instance.Qualied Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility 31
A Appendix











































Similarly, the growth constraint can be simplied into
3 X
i=1
(3   yi)(ci   c
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The Lagrangian in terms of the unconstrained ji;k's for this problem may be written as:
L =
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A.2 Change in Variance
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where r;l = j
r;l   jr;l. Let r be the realization at and below which the density falls or
remains unchanged (without lost of generality, assume that the stochastic dominance shift
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